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ABSTRACT
This paper explores how international capital movements affected the
domestic money supply. This requires that the causality at work in the
adjustment process be analyzed. For this purpose, series of central bank
reserves, the monetary base, the money supply and the balance of payments
were constructed. The methodological problems encountered in estimating
such monetary measures in a transitional economy where much of the
circulating money consists of private banks notes, and which is dependent
on foreign loans, is discussed. The relationship between central bank
(Riksbank) reserves and international capital flows is then studied. The
overall growth of the money supply, while not accompanied by a growth in
reserves, is found to correspond to such growth in other countries operating
under a specie standard. This growth also was related to the growth of the
real economy. Qualitative evidence aside, statistical results indicate a
relationship among reserves, the money supply and prices that is consistent
with the price specie flow mechanism. Changes in reserves were positively
related to the money supply and changes in the money supply had a lagged
positive effect on changes in the level of consumer prices.
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Introduction
The Swedish central bank, the Riksbank, together with the private note issuing banks,
the so called Enskilda banks, circulated notes exchangeable at par. These notes could be
used to make deposits throughout the banking system, and they were backed by the
Riksbank’s reserves. This arrangement, whereby the Enskilda banks backed their note
issuance with holdings of Riksbank notes, allowed Sweden to maintain more currency
in circulation, denoted as M1, than otherwise would have possible.
1
From the readoption of the silver standard in 1834 until the outbreak of World War I,
Sweden experienced an unbroken period of eighty years with a fixed exchange rate
system. The specie standard as such was of basic importance to Swedish economic
                                                
1 See Ögren, A. (2003c)4
growth.
2 The two questions addressed in this paper are if and how the Swedish money
supply was affected by international capital flows, and what were the consequences of
changes in that money supply.
One particular aspect of the specie standard is its role as an international adjustment
mechanism with a fixed world supply of high powered money, whether gold or silver,
serving as reserves and the basis for note issuance. The notion of a fixed stock of
reserves has been used as the basis for explaining the functioning of the economic
adjustment mechanism among countries. The channelling of these reserves from one
country to another served to transfer purchasing power.
There are two theories of how the adjustment mechanism functioned.  Although
related, they have very different implications for the causality at work. According to the
price specie flow model, the money supply is determined by the balance of payments
through changes in central bank reserves which, in accord with the quantity theory of
money, then affects the domestic price level. Finally, changes in the price level will
encourage or discourage exports, thereby correcting imbalances in the current account.
The monetary ”rules of the game” often related to the working of the classical gold
standard, called for this process to be allowed to proceed, or even to be accelerated by
using monetary policy to amplify the effects of the capital flows.
3
The alternative, related but causally different, theory is the monetary approach to the
balance of payments. In its purest form, the monetary approach to the balance of
payments assumes the law of one price, perfect international capital mobility and price
flexibility in all markets.
4 Changes in central bank reserves, however, illustrate that the
money market is not in equilibrium, the balance of payments being one of the
mechanisms for restoring such equilibrium. The causality is the opposite of that in the
specie flow mechanism. Increased (decreased) demand for money eventually will lead
to an inflow (outflow) of reserves. Monetary policy has little or no effect. As with
prices, domestic interest rates and money incomes ultimately are set in the global arena.
5
                                                
2 The conversion from silver to gold in 1873 was an uneventful adaptation to the European economic
reality of the time. According to Eichengreen and Flandreau, a country’s adherence to a convertible
specie standard was more important for economic growth than was the choice between gold and silver
(Eichengreen, B. & Flandreau, M. (1994) pp. 2-3, 6-8).
3 Bloomfield, A.I. (1978) pp. 47-49, Bordo, M.D. (1984) pp. 25-26, Gomes, L. (1993) pp. 18-21
4 Although McCloskey & Zecher argues that the monetary approach can do without the law of one price
(McCloskey, D.N. & Zecher, J.R. (1984) p. 122)
5 Gomes, L. (1993) pp. 10, 148, 160, 163-166, Kenwood, A.G. & Loughheed, A.L. (1999) pp. 114-115,
McCloskey, D.N. & Zecher, J.R. (1984) p. 126, McCloskey, D.N. & Zecher, J.R. (1985) pp. 65-66, 765
No student of the determinants of the Swedish money supply can fail to be inspired
by the work of Lars Jonung.  His book, ” Studies in the Monetary History of Sweden”
(1975), utilizes the theoretical framework of the quantity theory as developed by
Friedman and Schwartz for the United States in their classic work ” A Monetary History
of the United States”. Briefly put, Jonung argues that in Sweden the money supply and
the stock of gold reserves grew in parallel, and that the money stock appears to have
impacted prices both in the long and in the short run, thus lending support to the
quantity theory of money.
6 In 1984, Jonung published a paper entitled ”Swedish
Experience under the Classical Gold Standard, 1873-1914". In it he argued that the
Swedish experience under the classical gold standard fit well within the monetary
approach to the balance of payments.
7
Nowhere in this work, however, does Jonung test the direction of the causality at
work. Thus he leaves it unclear whether changes in reserves preceded changes in the
money supply, as implied by the quantity theory, or vice versa. He also presents no test
of whether or not the monetary base and the money multiplier were related to the money
supply. These questions are addressed in this paper, starting with the re-adoption of the
silver standard in 1834. An additional advantage of the work presented here is that it is
based on revised, more accurate, estimates of central bank reserves, the monetary base
and the money supply.
8
This paper is divided into four sections. The first of these contains estimates of the
monetary measures, as well as a methodological discussion of the problems of defining
these concepts in a consistent manner. The second section focuses on the reserves of the
Swedish central bank, the Riksbank, and how the Bank managed the classical specie
standard, as well as the impact of foreign debt. It ends with an attempt to measure the
degree of monetary discipline practiced under the silver and gold standards. Next, in the
third section the growth of the money supply is examined in relation to the fixed
exchange rate regime. Finally, the fourth section concerns the causality among changes
in reserves, the money supply and prices. On the assumption that these causal
                                                
6 Jonung, L. (1975) pp. 144-146, 191-195, 203, 208-211. Under the silver standard, the money stock grew
with 16.1 percent every year, in contrast to prices that only grew with 1 percent. Under the gold standard
1874-1913 the money stock increased with 5.2 percent yearly and prices with only 0.2 percent.
7 Jonung, L. (1984) pp. 389-393.
8 See also Ögren, A. (2003c)6
relationships were complex and movements in the variables interrelated, Vector Auto
Regressions were utilized.
9
The Theoretical Framework and Monetary Definitions
In orthodox economic theory, three sets of actors determine the domestic money supply
in a fractional reserve banking system: 1) the monetary authorities, 2) the banking
sector, and 3) the public. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the ability of the
monetary authorities to alter the money supply is constrained by their need to maintain
reserves. These, in turn are affected by the balance of payments. The theoretical relation
between the domestic money supply and its determinants are summarized in five
equations:
(1)  M = C + D; where M denotes the money supply, C the public’s holding of
currency and D the public’s deposits in the banking system.
(2)  B = C + R; where B is base money, usually defined as the monetary liabilities
of the authorities. These liabilities are balanced by a corresponding amount of
assets that actually, or potentially, can by used as reserves by the banking
system.  The R denotes reserves held by the banking system.
(3)  r = R / D; r is the reserve to deposits ratio of the banks. It is through this
mechanism, being part of the money multiplier, that the banking system
affects the size of the money supply.
(4)  c = C / M; c is the currency to money ratio. It measures the public’s desire to
hold currency. It is through this part of the money multiplier that the public’s
preferences affect the money supply.
(5)  M = B / (c + r – cr); this is the equation that relates the supply of base money
(B), through the money multiplier (1/(c+r-cr)), to the total money supply M.
This last equation is often written as M = mB; where m denotes the multiplier.
Two serious concerns arise when making this theoretical framework operational for
purposes of research: 1) Equations 1 and 2 together indicate that currency not consisting
of the public’s deposits, by definition, has to be base money. Conversely, all liabilities
held by the public that are not issued by the monetary authorities must be deposits, and
                                                
9 The VAR test differs from the Granger test in that it besides form including several independent
variables, also includes values of the dependent values from prior periods. Still, as is the case with the
Granger causality, its predictive power is based on precedence and not actual causality, which of course is
impossible to prove in a statistical test.7
2) Consequently, the outcome of the research is to a large degree dependent on what
these monetary components actually consist of.
In Jonung’s work, the money supply was defined as the public’s holdings of
Riksbank and Enskilda bank notes, plus their deposits in commercial banks. The
monetary base consisted of the sum of 1) the Riksbank note holdings of the public and
the commercial banks, 2) the specie holdings of the commercial banks and 3) the
deposits of the commercial banks with the Riksbank and the National Debt Office.
10
The Monetary Base
In this section, the quantity of base money and the balance of payments are estimated
utilizing the approach of Jonung (1975) for Sweden and of Officer (2002) for the United
States. The definition of the monetary base is straightforward: It consists of those assets
that actually, or potentially, could be used as reserves by the commercial banking
system. It is closely related to the balance of payments, any imbalance in which
constitutes the effects of international transactions on the monetary base.
11
This general definition of the monetary base, however, does not make the
measurement of its components a simple task. Still, three types of assets can arguably be
said to have constituted the Swedish monetary base under the classical specie standard:
specie, the net foreign assets of the Riksbank and Riksbank notes.
12
Throughout this period, specie was the principal ingredient of the Riksbank’s
reserves. It was also utilized by the Enskilda banks after the implementation of the
Banking Act of 1874.  Indeed, this legislation required that the Enskilda bank notes be
redeemable in specie even though these notes did not receive legal tender status. It
could be argued that the Enskilda bank notes should be counted as part of the monetary
base starting in 1874, but in fact the commercial banks only held such notes to a minor
extent. While it might have been felt that holding the liabilities of other commercial
banks tended to give the issuing bank a competitive advantage, the principal reason was
                                                
10 Jonung, L. (1975) pp. 13, 29, 208-215. Jonung did not discuss the problem of how to characterize the
Enskilda bank notes, as part of the public’s preference for holding currency or part of the public’s
deposits in the banking system. He included Enskilda bank notes in the money stock as part of the
public’s holdings of notes when defining the measure, but did include it in commercial bank deposits
when calculating the currency money ratio (Jonung, L. (1975) p. 13, 54, 71, 78, 215).
11 Officer, L.H. (2002) pp. 114-115, 119
12 Officer, L.H. (2002) p. 127. The Treasury in Sweden, the National Debt Office, only issued notes
between 1789 and 1818. Instead the NDO raised capital by issuing bonds from the late 1850s. This was
mainly done in the capital markets of Frankfurt am Main, Hamburg, London and Paris (see Ögren, A.
(2003b).8
probably the public’s preference for access to legal tender. Quantitative evidence
supports the contention that specie and Riksbank notes, but not Enskilda bank notes,
served as potential commercial bank reserves.
Figure 1: The Enskilda banks’ Holdings of Specie, Riksbank and other Enskilda bank
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Sources: Post & Inrikes Tidning, 1844-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1871-1900
Figure 1 indicates that the Enskilda banks preferred to hold Riksbank notes rather
than the notes of other Enskilda banks. Despite the 1897 decision that all the Enskilda
bank notes were to be withdrawn from circulation by 1906, the holdings of these notes
was unchanged as late as 1903. Clearly these notes were held in anticipation of an
opportunity to redeem them. The specie holdings recorded starting in 1874, was
obviously at the expense of Riksbank notes. The Enskilda banks were simply
exchanging Riksbank notes for specie to the extent legally required.
13
Thus, in a nutshell, even though the Enskilda bank notes could be used for deposits
in other banks, starting in 1869 even in the Riksbank, these notes did not satisfy the
requirements for serving as potential reserves for the commercial banking system. This
remained the case even after they were made redeemable in specie in 1874.
Notes issued by the central bank, however, served as potential reserves for the
banking system. Indeed, Riksbank liabilities other than notes formally contributed to the
money stock. These included demand deposits, cheques, postal bank bills and, until
1872, a fund dedicated to certain types of loans. Deposits in the Riksbank were used as
                                                
13 See Ögren, A. (2003c)9
bank reserves, including as backing for Enskilda bank notes. Riksbank cheques and
postal bank bills circulated just like notes and were backed by specie.
14 The unutilized
part of the loan fund specifically dedicated to certain types of loans, which was of
considerable size by its ending in 1872, should be deducted from the monetary base.
Foreign assets of the Riksbank utilized as backing for note issuance included
holdings in banks and banking firms abroad, as well as foreign treasury bonds. Starting
with the crisis of 1857/58, foreign bills of exchange became part of the reserves, even
thought this practice had originated as a way of circumventing the demands of the
specie standard. One reason it was abandoned in 1872 was that commercial banks held
bank credits abroad and then had the Riksbank discount bills drawn on these credits.
Ending the inclusion of these bills in the formal reserves of the Riksbank, however, did
not end the discounting of such bills. Indeed, the Riksbank holdings of such bills
increased throughout the period. Since the Riksbank used foreign bills of exchange to
influence the exchange rate through open market operations, these bills should be
included in the monetary base.
15
One difficulty with the Swedish case is the absence of data on the circulation of
coins, including specie. Since contemporary sources complain about the shortage coins,
I have accepted the assumption of prior works that this circulation was insignificant.
Between 1834 and 1843, Riksbank notes circulating in Finland also should be deducted
from the Swedish monetary base.
16 Thus, the net contribution of the Riksbank to the
monetary base was its issue of money, minus the sum of: 1) its notes circulating abroad,
2) the “dedicated” loan fund, 3) its holdings of specie, and 4) its net foreign assets.
17
                                                
14 Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 18-31, 54-71. Regarding so called postnotes in the US, see Officer L.H.
(2002) pp. 123-124.
15 See Ögren, A. (2003b). Regarding the active use of the bills of exchange to stabilize the exchange rate
of the Swedish currency, see Lobell (2000), and about the commercial banks use of foreign credits see
Söderlund, E. (1964). The locked loan fund was abandoned at the same time as bills of exchange were
banned from being used as reserves in 1872, as part of the modernization of the Riksbank (see Brisman,
S. (1931)).
16 This was made by assuming that the entire trade deficit towards Finland was paid in Riksbank notes
from 1834 until 1840, and then using Davidsson’s figures for repayments. This means that 3 million SEK
was already circulating in Finland at the beginning of the period. See Davidsson, D. (1931:1) pp. 205-517
17 This is one way of specifying how the monetary authorities adds to the stock of base money.10
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Sources: Davidsson, D. (1931:1) pp. 205, 211, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1874-1900, Sveriges
Riksbank (1931) pp. 18-31, 54-71
 As figure 2 indicates, the monetary base was fairly stable until it took off during the
closing years of the nineteenth century. Both specie reserves and the Bank’s
contribution to the monetary base, started to increase rapidly during the late 1890s. This
was only partly a result of the cessation of Enskilda bank note issuance.
18 The specie
part of the monetary base mainly increased during the booms of the 1850s and the
1870s.
The Monetary Balance of Payments
The monetary balance of payments is closely linked to the monetary base. Indeed, the
most direct way to view the balance of payments is as changes in central bank reserves.
The monetary balance of payments is defined as net specie imports plus the change in
net foreign assets held by the authorities. Thus it is the sum of all international
transactions that affect the size of the monetary base. The balance of payments series for
the United States estimated by Officer includes net changes in the foreign holdings of
both the Treasury and the central bank.
19
                                                
18 Ögren, A. (2003c)
19 Officer, L.H. (2002) pp. 132-13311








































































Source: Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 18-31, 54-71
In Figure 3 above, the balance of payments consists of changes in the Riksbank’s
specie and its net foreign holdings. Capital flows related to the foreign liabilities of the
National Debt Office are not included. Thus this series does not include the current
account deficits financed by the importation of capital. A further discussion of the
relationship of the foreign debt to the monetary base and the balance of payments now
follows.
Methodological Problems of Estimating the Monetary Base
It should now be apparent that the concepts of monetary base and the balance of
payments are not problem free. Two principal difficulties arise: 1) what constitutes
potential commercial bank reserves, and 2) what is to be included among the net foreign
assets of the authorities?
As highlighted by the discussion of how to classify Enskilda bank notes, the
definition of potential banking reserves is plagued by the problem of evaluating the
liabilities of domestic financial actors. One aspect of the monetary base is that it is
provided by so-called outside agents. Thus, its size can be altered only through
international transactions and the domestic production of specie.
20 Thus, domestic
financial assets and liabilities, other than notes issued by the central bank, should not be
considered part of the monetary base.
21
                                                
20 Officer, L.H. (2002) p. 119
21 This is not at all self evident. One argument may be that the notes were redeemable for specie, but so
were notes issued by Enskilda banks after 1874.12
Nonetheless, the Swedish banks were allowed to use bonds issued by the National
Debt Office, local governments and mortgage associations both as part of their equity
capital and as legal backing for their notes.
22 If such financial assets were to be included
in the monetary base, it would increase in step with the domestic demand for credit.
























































































Bond loans placed outside Sweden
Source: Flodström, I. (1912) pp. 812-815
Figure 4 demonstrates that the level of outstanding bond loans, both foreign and
domestic, was substantial. In addition to the problem of categorizing the domestic bond
holdings of the commercial banks as arguably being utilized as reserves, there is the
problem of deciding which types of net foreign assets held by the authorities should be
included in the monetary base. The National Debt Office placed its bonds on the
international capital market. In the case of the Unites States, Officer concluded that the
contribution of net foreign assets to the monetary base was of little importance.
23 For
Sweden, a small, open, capital importing economy, however, this certainly was not the
case.
In particular the foreign borrowing of the National Debt Office brought this question
to the fore. Officer included the net foreign assets of the central bank and Treasury
                                                
22 It should also be noted, that legal reserve requirements for Enskilda banks concerned backing of notes,
and not any other liability (Ögren, A. (2003c). For joint stock banks, without the right to issue notes, a
minimum size of equity capital was specified. Furthermore, Jonung included some liabilities of the
National Debt Office in the monetary base, namely the commercial banks’ deposits in this authority
(Jonung, L. (1975) p. 29).
23 Officer, L.H. (2002) p. 12813
currency held by foreigners in the US monetary base.
24 On that basis, it is unclear why
the foreign liabilities of the National Debt Office should be excluded from the Swedish
monetary base. Granted, the bonds issued by the Office were long term and neither the
Office or the Riksbank guaranteed their instant convertibility into currency. Even so,
had they been issued directly by the Riksbank on behalf of the State, instead of the
National Debt Office, they would have been included.
Consequently, the net foreign assets component of the monetary base has been
calculated in two alternative ways: with and without the foreign liabilities of the
National Debt Office, the principal capital importer. If it is assumed that the Office’s
foreign borrowing equaled that part of the current account deficit not covered by
changes in the reserves, or non-reserve foreign assets, of the Riksbank, then the foreign
liabilities of the Office can be calculated as the annual difference between the current
account and the reserves, minus the non-reserve financial assets of the Riksbank. To
convert this into a measure of net foreign assets, this series has been summed over the
period.
Figure 5: The Monetary Base Including (MBASE-CA) and Excluding (MBASE) Net












































































(+) or Liabilities (-)
MBASE - CA
Sources: Davidsson, D. (1931:1) pp. 205, 211, Lindahl et al. (1937:2) p. 585, Sammandrag af Bankernas
Uppgifter 1874-1900, Schön, L. (1999), Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 18-31, 54-71
The not so surprising result of this exercise in calculating official net foreign assets
from the current account is that Sweden had a negative monetary base. This poses an
                                                
24 Officer, L.H. (2002) p. 12714
intriguing question: If official long term borrowing is not part of the monetary base,
how should the capital flows associated with such borrowing be treated? Can the
foreign debt position of the National Debt Office be ignored simply because the Office
had no responsibility for the specie standard? Clearly, methodological issues arise when
defining the monetary situation of a country dependent on international capital and a
large part of whose money supply consists of private bank notes. This exercise
demonstrates that spatially and chronologically independent monetary concepts can
become problematic when they are to be made operational. There will always be some
questions as to what items are to be included. Inevitably, these monetary measures will
have to be considered on a case by case basis.
The Money Supply
In addition to the so called monetary base, a more appropriate measure of the circulating
money supply was the quantity of Riksbank and Enskilda bank notes outstanding, minus
the Riksbank notes held as reserves by the Enskilda banks. As a result of the small
number banking offices and their limited hours of operation, demand deposits in
commercial banks were not readily accessible in nineteenth century Sweden.
25






































































RB & EB notes in circulation (M1)
(M1)+ Public deposits in commercial banks (M2)
(M2) + Public deposits in Savings banks (M3)
Sources: Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1874-1900, SCB
(1960) pp. 99, 102-103, Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 54-71, 172-185
                                                
25 See Ögren, A (2003c)15
No matter what the theoretical definition states, there was a clear difference between
money circulating as Enskilda bank notes and being held as deposits. Under these
circumstances, the above measure of the total stock of notes in circulation is labeled
M1. M2 is defined as M1 plus the public’s deposits in commercial banks and M3 as M2
plus the public’s deposits in savings banks. The considerable business activity of the
Swedish savings banks makes M3 a more useful measure than M2.
26 The two periods of
substantial commercial bank establishment, the late 1860's and the mid 1890's, both
display a marked acceleration in the growth of the two money supply measures, M2 and
M3.
The Flexibility of the Riksbank’s Reserves and the Practice of
Monetary Discipline
Qualitative sources clearly demonstrate that changes in the size of the Riksbank’s
reserves was the signal that action to preserve convertibility was required. Frequently,
the initial reaction of the Board of the Riksbank was to add to those reserves considered
as legal backing for the Bank’s notes. When the outflow of reserves persisted, however,
the Board was forced to decrease its notes in circulation, that is to say, the money
supply.
27
International Capital and the Riksbank’s Reserves
Starting in the late 1850's, the National Debt Office imported capital to finance the
building of the national railway system. In addition, some of these loans were taken to
alleviate distress on the domestic credit market. It has been estimated that by 1910 the
average Swede owed more to foreign countries than did the residents of any other
country in the world. Sixty years of chronic current account deficits had increased the
foreign debt to an amount equal to three quarters of the Country’s entire GDP.
28
As can be seen in Figure 7, changes in the reserves of the Riksbank were small
compared to the current account balance. Moreover, the reserves did not consistently
                                                
26 See Lilja, K. (2000), Petersson, T. (2000). The money stock 1871-1971 calculated in the study of
Jonung, consisted of the volume of Enskilda and Riksbank notes held by the public plus deposits from the
non-banking sector in commercial banks (Jonung, L. (1975) pp. 13, 208-211).
27 See BaU 1834 – 1900 No 1 (Reports from the Board of the Riksbank to the Parliament), Davidsson, D.
(1931:2) pp. 145-146, RbFP 1856 – 1859, 1869 – 1881, RbFSP 1869 – 1881, Ögren, A. (1995) pp. 18,
30, 36. See also Ögren, A. (2003b).
28 Schön, L. (2000) p. 270. In spite of this, the National Debt Office that very same year launched a large
bond loan on the foreign market to ease the constrained situation on the Swedish money market (Schön,
L. (2000) p. 262). See also Ögren, A. (2003b).16
move in the opposite direction of the current account, illustrating the importance of
capital imports. Indeed, to simultaneously sustain imports, maintain the money supply
and protect the specie standard would have been impossible without the international
capital market.













































































Sources: Schön, L. (1999), Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 54-71
The Swedish experience was that business fluctuations impacted trade activities.
During years of crisis, imports declined more than exports, while during years of rapid
economic growth, imports increased more than exports. Between 1834 and 1913, annual
changes in imports were more closely correlated with changes in GDP, measured either
in current prices or in volume, than were changes in exports.
Figure 8: Correlations Between Annual Changes in Imports and Exports with Annual
Changes in GDP , 1834-1913.
D(EXPORTS) D(IMPORT)
D(GDPCV)  0.30  0.76
D(GDPVOL)  0.17  0.52
Sources: Krantz, O. (1997) pp. 12-14, 20-22, Lindahl, E. et al. (1937:2) p. 585, Schön, L. (1999)
From a pure balance of trade perspective, the recessions were beneficial. At the same
time, however, there was a shrinking of the Riksbank’s reserves. Throughout the period
from 1834 until 1913, the Riksbank’s reserves were positively associated with the
international business cycle. That is to say, foreign crisis were reflected in Sweden
through decreasing reserves. Despite theoretical predictions to the contrary, in an17
international exchange rate system based on specie it was possible for reserves in
various countries to shrink, or increase, simultaneously.
29
The Flexibility of Riksbank Reserves
Try as it might, the Riksbank was not able to insulate the Swedish economy from the
effects of international capital flows. This became increasingly apparent after foreign
borrowing started to rapidly increase beginning during the 1850's. What the Bank could
do, however, was to protect the relationship between its note issue and its reserves
which served as the basis for international convertibility.
Figure 9: The Reserves of the Riksbank at Current Prices (1000 SEK), and the




































































































RBs total reserve in 1000 kr
RBs total reserve in percent of issued notes
Source: Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 54-71
Since the capital imports were long used to finance the import of good and services,
the reserves of the Riksbank did not start to grow until the end of the nineteenth century.
The reason that a small, capital importing, country such as Sweden could mitigate the
effects of the international business cycle can possible be traced to the composition of
the Riksbank’s reserves. Despite the theoretical mechanisms of the specie system, based
as it was on a finite, world wide, stock of high powered money to be used as reserves
and a fixed relationship between those reserves and the money supply, the system in
                                                
29 The correlations between monthly changes in percent of the reserves of Bank of England, Banque de
France and the German Reichsbank for the period 1880 until 1913 were not negative. A small positive
correlation was found between the reserves of the German Recihsbank and the Banque de France (0.190),
and a stronger correlation between the German Recihsbank and the Bank of England (0.463), both these18
fact had a degree of elasticity.  The reserves of the Riksbank deviated from the ”ideal”
specie standard model in three regards:
First, during the business cycle the Riksbank could vary its note issue within certain
legal parameters. That is, it could utilize its right to issue notes to a different extent
during periods when capital was flowing in or out. During most of the period between
1834 and 1913, the Bank allowed the degree of backing for its notes to vary with the
size of its reserves.
30
Second, the Riksbank could alter the composition of its formal reserves and other
assets, as well as of its liabilities. Thus the Bank could hold assets that did not qualify as
backing for notes but which could be transformed into reserves through sale in the
domestic or the international capital market. In 1872, the Riksbank established a fund
consisting of assets that did not qualify as reserves but which were to be used to offset,
and thus sterilize, outflows of reserves.
31 In addition the bank utilized open market
operations to increase the demand for Swedish currency. This was done to preserve the
Swedish currency’s value and even, to the extent possible, reduce its variability.
32
Third, starting in 1845, foreign assets, as well as specie, were considered to be part of
the Bank’s formal reserves. It is possible that the fact that the Riksbank was the central
bank of a small peripheral country allowed it make its reserves more elastic than
otherwise would have been possible under the specie standard. Credit instruments
outside the finite, theoretical, world stock of specie could be used as reserves. The
Riksbank’s foreign assets that counted were foreign national government bonds,
deposits with banks and banking firms and, between 1858 and 1872, foreign bills of
exchange.
                                                                                                                                          
were significant at the 1 % level. No significant correlation was found between the reserves of Bank of
England and Banque de France. (Flandreau, M. (2000)).
30 Correlations between percentile changes in the size of the reserves and the backing of notes were highly
positive and significant at the 1 % level for both the silver and the gold standard period.
31 Brisman, S. (1931) pp. 116-119, 143-145, Ögren, A. (1995) pp. 22-23, 34-40. The Riksbank acted in
this manner during the entire period, and it should be noted that besides ensuring convertibility the
Riksbank was meant to provide credits in a stable manner. This was of course far from as important as
maintaining international convertibility, but it shows that the working of the Riksbank under the classical
specie standard did not admit to any ‘rules of the game’.
32 See Lobell, H. (2000)19












































































Source: Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 54-71
The Swedish experience was that if the Riksbank transferred purchasing power by
purchasing the State bonds of one of the core countries of the specie standard, this
would not force the Bank to reduce its note issue. It only constituted the exchange of
one type of reserve for another. If the central banks of other specie standard countries
also held the bonds of other specie standard governments as formal reserves, then such
purchases would increase total reserves. In addition, if expectations concerning further
growth of these economics was positive, then the value of these items used as reserves
would also increase. Furthermore, the holding of reserves in the form of bonds and
deposits had the additional advantage that they yielded interest, thus further helping to
consolidate the Riksbank’s reserve position.
Measuring Monetary Discipline
Assuming that the specie standard worked in accordance with the monetary approach to
the balance of payments makes it possible to evaluate the degree of monetary discipline
exercised during various periods. The measure of monetary discipline used is the ratio
of the monetary base to the stock of specie. The more the monetary base is allowed to
expand relative to the stock of specie, the less strict the specie standard.
33 The specie
stock used for this purpose is the sum of the specie holdings acceptable for use as
reserves by the Riksbank and by the Enskilda banks.
An alternative perspective on monetary discipline results from focusing on the
operations of the central bank. It can be argued that specie holdings per see are more a
                                                
33 Officer, L.H. (2002) pp. 136-13720
measure of how well the Country followed the rules of the specie standard rather than of
how well the fixed exchange rate was protected.
34 It was more efficient for a small
Country to maintain reserves in the form of British and German Government bonds. In
reality, international transactions were not settled with specie. Thus, holders of Swedish
currency where not interested in exchanging it for specie.
Figure 11: The Mean Value of the Ratio of the Monetary Base to the Stock of Specie
and to the Reserves of the Riksbank
Mbase/Specie
Mean
Value Period Mean Value Period Mean Value
Silver Std, 1834-1873. 2,51 1834-39 1,67 1870-79 2,32
Gold Std, 1874-1913 S 2,28 1840-49 2,17 1880-89 2,25
Gold Std US., 1879-1913 2,17 1850-59 2,37 1890-99 1,99
1860-69 3,38 1900-13 2,63
Mbase/Rbreserves
Mean
Value Period Mean Value Period Mean Value
Silver Std, 1834-1873 2,26 1834-39 1,67 1870-79 1,93
Gold Std, 1874-1913 1,80 1840-49 2,12 1880-89 2,29
1850-59 1,98 1890-99 1,93
1860-69 2,42 1900-13 2,00
Sources: Davidsson, D. (1931:1) pp. 205, 211, Officer, L.H. (2002) p. 137, Sammandrag af Bankernas
Uppgifter 1874-1900, Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 18-31, 54-71
Discipline was somewhat less strict under the silver than under the gold standard.
Judging the entire period, discipline was strictest in connection with the readoption of
the silver standard in 1834 and the most lax during the economically gloomy 1860's.
During that decade, reserves flowed out during the Danish-Prussian War of 1864, as the
result of international crises and to pay for the food imports required to mitigate the
famine caused by the crop failures between 1866 and 1869.
35 The relatively low
discipline observed during the early years of the twentieth century can only partly be
blamed on the replacement of Enskilda bank notes since the total supply of notes in
circulation increased.
36
                                                
34 The fact that the Riksbank held sufficient British, and German, Govenrmental bonds in the reserves
was probably more important for adhering to the silver and gold standards, than was the fact that the
Enskilda banks held specie in their reserves. But the measure of monetary discipline by holding specie
will conclude otherwise.
35 Under the flag of Scandinavianism, Sweden had promised to support Denmark in case of war. As this
war became a reality 1864, Swedish reserves rapidly decreased until Sweden withdrew this “promise”.
The great famine 1866 until 1868 was a supply crisis, reserves were deployed to import food, but prices
remained high and transactions low. Besides the lack of food to trade there was no capacity to transport
food to the areas most in need. See Davidsson, D. (1931:2) and Ögren, A. (2000) p. 95 note 43.
36 See Ögren, A. (2003c).21
Starting in the 1850's, the measures of monetary discipline changed significantly.
Overall, the gold standard was a less ”pure” specie standard than was the silver
standard. Interestingly enough, the National Debt Office began to borrow on
international markets at about the same time that it became possible to substitute foreign
assets for specie reserves.
Despite the crisis of 1857/58, and the measures the Riksbank took to deal with it, the
1850's do not seem to have been characterized by a specific lack of monetary discipline.
Figure 12 below shows the monetary pyramid ratio for each year during the entire
period.























































































Sources: Davidsson, D. (1931) pp. 205, 211, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1874-1900, Sveriges
Riksbank (1931) pp. 18-31, 54-71
A review of the annual monetary pyramid ratio of the monetary base to the stock of
specie yields several interesting observations concerning the measurement of monetary
discipline. First, the peak indicating lax monetary discipline in the early 1840's can be
credited to the redemption with specie of the Riksbank notes circulating in Finland. This
episode of reduced monetary discipline also coincided with the practical abandonment
of the fixed exchange rate. Here the pyramid ratio indicates decreased monetary
discipline by the central bank.
Second, the sharp rise, once again indicating reduced monetary discipline, starting
with the crisis of 1857 coincides well with the actions of the Riksbank during the crisis
itself.
37 The short term loan taken in Hamburg in January 1858 to sustain the domestic
                                                
37 See Ögren, A. (2003b).22
credit market, however, indicates a higher degree of monetary discipline than during the
following years.  Given the definition of the monetary base, raising foreign capital, thus
decreasing the net foreign assets of the Riksbank, decreases the ratio of the monetary
base to the stock of specie. This, in turn, indicates a higher degree of monetary
discipline. When the loan is repaid, the opposite happens. This effect is doubled if the
foreign loan is used to import specie. In that case, not only does the monetary base
decrease, but the holdings of specie increase. Thus, when the international capital
market is utilized to maintain domestic liquidity, while still preserving the fixed
exchange rate, the measure of monetary discipline is distorted, or at least the effect is
lagged. That is why monetary discipline appears to be at its weakest during the 1860's
when the crisis loan was being repaid.
38
Third, with the private banks scheduled to begin holding specie in 1874, the ratio
decreased rapidly from 3.5 in 1870 to less than 2.3 in 1873, possibly as a consequence
of the conversion to the gold standard in 1873. The ratio then remained reasonable
stable until the turn of the twentieth century when the Riksbank greatly expanded its
note issue.
Differences in the results of the two measures of monetary discipline was most
significant from the mid 1850’s to the mid 1870’s. Measuring monetary discipline
solely by specie holdings creates problems when other assets also are important.
Nevertheless, as the experience of the crisis of the late 1850's demonstrates, measuring
discipline by including the formal reserves allows the authorities to tamper with the size
of the reserves.
Monetary discipline was imposed by foreign lenders, it did not follow automatically
from adopting the gold standard. Instead, the decision to adopt the gold standard was
taken in order to remain in harmony with the most important lenders.
                                                
38 The choice of how to fund increases in the monetary base affected the measure of monetary discipline.
This stresses the difficulty of definitions, and their impact on results, even more. Consider the two likely
scenarios: 1) the central bank selling off domestic treasury bonds abroad, then using the funds to purchase
specie. This will increase monetary discipline. As specie is part of the monetary base, the monetary base
as well as the central banks holdings of specie will nominally increase equally in size. But, since specie is
a smaller portion than the monetary base, the relative increase in specie holding increases more then the
relative increase in the monetary base increasing monetary discipline. 2) The central bank borrowing
money from abroad to purchase specie. As in the former example this will increase both specie holdings
and the monetary base. However, since net foreign assets of the central bank is included in the monetary
base, the decrease in net foreign assets will cancel out the import of specie, that is the increase in the
monetary base. Thus, in the latter example the disciplinary effect of the central bank action will be higher
than in the former since the amount of specie increases but not the total amount of the monetary base.23
The Growth of the Money Supply
The question is, how was the growth in the issue of Riksbank notes and the money
supply related to specie holdings, to the Riksbank’s reserves and to the monetary base?
In theory, the specie standard emphasizes specie holdings as the basis for expansion of
the money supply. Even under the gold and silver standards, however, specie became a
less and less important part of the money supply as the banking system expanded and
other items increasingly served as reserves.






























































































Sources: Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1874-1900, SCB
(1960) pp. 99, 102-103, Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 54-71, 172-185
The money supply measure used by Jonung in his study is what is here labeled M2,
that is the public’s holdings of Riksbank and Enskilda bank notes plus its deposits in
commercial banks. Based on five year averages, Jonung determined that under the gold
standard there was stable parallel growth in the gold reserve and the money supply. He
offered this result as evidence supporting Cassel’s theories of price level movements.
39
Figure 13, however, raises doubts about such a relationship since prices did not move
in the same direction as the ratios pictured. The figure also puts into question the
importance of focusing on the specie part of the money supply in explaining the
workings of the adjustment mechanism.
                                                
39 Jonung, L. (1975) pp. 139-142, 144-147, 15324
According to the monetary approach to the balance of payments, a relationship exists
between the monetary base and the various measures of the money supply, including the
public’s bank deposits. Jonung also noted a pattern indicating that the growth of the
money supply was largely dependent of the growth of the monetary base.
40 In fact,
however, the Swedish money supply in terms of M1, M2 or M3 did not grow in accord
with the expansion of Riksbank reserves, Riksbank notes issued or the monetary base.
41
Figure 14: Money Supply (M1), Issued Riksbank Notes (RBISS), Formal Reserves of the











































































Sources: Davidsson, D. (1931:1) pp. 205, 211, Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af
Bankernas Uppgifter 1874-1900, Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 18-31, 54-71
While the Riksbank’s note issue increased at the same rate as its reserves under the
silver standard, this was not the case under the gold standard. Instead the issuance of
notes greatly exceeded the increase in the Bank’s reserves. This new development can
be credited largely to the issuance of Riksbank notes, not accompanied by any increase
in reserves, intended to replace the Enskilda bank notes that were being withdrawn from
circulation at the turn of the twentieth century. Clearly these Enskilda bank notes earlier
                                                
40 Jonung, L. (1975) pp. 37, 48-50, 63
41 For the entire period 1834 until 1913, all the series on money supply, issued Riksbank notes, the
monetary base and Riksbank reserves were non-stationary. Even though all series are non-stationary over
the entire period 1834-1913, a cointegration analysis might be misleading, as the non-stationarity seemed
to be the result of a structural break late in the period. Still, an attempt to conduct a Johansen’s test for
cointegration over the entire period 1834 until 1913 does not indicate any long term relation with M1, M2
or M3 for any of the variables of RBISS, RBRES or MBASE. In lack of a better method, cointegration
tests started with a large number of lags that was decreased (see Maddala, G.S. & Kim, I-M. (1998) p.
191)25
had played a major role in providing the money that the convertibility requirements had
prevented the Riksbank from supplying.
42
Figure 15: Growth in Percentage of the Money Supply (M1), (M2), (M3) Issued
Riksbank Notes (RBISS), Formal Reserves of the Riksbank (RBRES) and the Monetary
Base (MBASE)
Growth under Period M1 M2 M3 RBISS RBRES MBASE
1834-1913 633% 5184% 7345% 650% 395% 493%
1834-1900 380% 2456% 3453% 199% 167% 151%
1834-1873 (Silver Std.) 204% 610% 841% 124% 124% 124%
1874-1913 (Gold Std.) 325% 731% 749% 578% 253% 322%
1901-1913 150% 194% 197% 232% 159% 232%
Sources: Davidsson, D. (1931:1) pp. 205, 211, Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af
Bankernas Uppgifter 1874-1900, SCB (1960) pp. 99, 102-103, Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 18-31, 54-
71, 172-185
Since virtually no Enskilda bank notes were in circulation at the beginning of the
period, and none at all after 1906, for the entire period there is a virtual identity between
the increase in M1 and the issue of Riksbank notes. Looking at sub periods, however,
makes it clear that M1 grew more or less independently of the other variables in Figure
15.
If the money supply grew independently of the level of reserves, how was the specie
standard maintained? Triffin has argued that the gold standard era was more a period of
credit money than of gold. Thus, the focus on the international adjustment mechanism
overshadowed the forces that controlled the overall rate of monetary expansion, a rate
which all the individual countries had to accept. When the credit economy was growing,
all countries with stable exchange rates were bound to experience approximately the
same pace of money supply growth. If that had not been case, it would have been
impossible to maintain stability in international exchange rates. According to the
monetary approach to the balance of payments, inflationary pressure would have led to
a balance of payments deficit which, in turn, would have weakened the reserve position
of the domestic economy.
43
This argument made by Triffin also validates the importance of the composition of
central bank reserves. In particular, the use of foreign financial assets as part of formal
reserves, and thus as backing for note issuance, partly could explain the overall
monetary expansion under the gold standard.
                                                
42 See Ögren, A. (2003c).
43 Kenwood, A.G. & Lougheed, A.L. (1999) p.118, Triffin, R. (1985) pp.121, 128-129, 13326
Figure 16: Circulating Notes plus the Public’s Deposits in Commercial and Savings
Banks (M3) in Sweden and Some of Its Principal Trading Partners, 1834 – 1913.
































































































Sources: Mitchell, B.R. (1998) pp.784-789, 793-195, 800-803, Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871,
Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1874-1900, SCB (1960) pp. 99, 102-103, Sveriges Riksbank (1931)
pp. 54-71, 172-185
The indexes of the money supply in various countries over the period 1834 to 1913
clearly display an upward trend. Among the countries in Figure 16, this is particularly
striking for Sweden and Germany. Since Germany was the foreign economy with the
greatest impact on Sweden, this similarity might indicate a long run relationship in the
growth of the money supply.
44
This argument might explain why the growth of the money supply in the various
countries on the classical specie standard was so similar. Nonetheless, maintaining
convertibility in the long run probably would not have been possible had the growing
money supply not been related to economic growth. The results of Johansen’s test
indicates that GDP at constant prices (GDPVOL) and the measure of the money supply
consisting of circulating Riksbank and Enskilda bank notes were cointegrated.
Economic growth, as measured by GDPVOL, however, was not cointegrated with any
other measure of the money supply.
45 In addition, neither of the various measures of the
money supply were cointegrated with growth in the commercial banking sector,
measured as commercial bank assets and commercial bank credit.
                                                
44 Johansen’s test indicates that cointegration, a long run relationship, existed between the Swedish
money supply and that of Denmark, France, Germany and Great Britain in nominal values. But the likely
problems of what these figures actually contain makes it risky to draw any conclusions based on this test.
45 I thank Camilla Josephsson for performing this cointegration test for me.27
Figure 17: Johansen’s test on Cointegration between Real Output (GDPVOL) and the
Money Supply in terms of Circulating Notes in stable prices (MIDEF), 1834-1913.
Sample(adjusted): 1837 1913
Series: GDPVOL M1DEF
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test
Hypothesized Trace 5 Percent 1 Percent
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value
None **  0.296869  30.57333  15.41  20.04
At most 1  0.043854  3.453022   3.76   6.65
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 1% levels
Sources: Krantz, O. (1997) pp. 20-22, Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas
Uppgifter 1874-1900, SCB (1960) pp. 99, 102-103, Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 172-185
The existence of a cointegration vector implies that there was a stable, stationary,
relationship in the residual between economic growth and the money supply. Thus, in
the long run, economic growth and the growth of the money supply in terms of
circulating Riksbank and Enskilda bank notes were related.
46 The lack of a measurable
relationship between growth in the money supply and in the reserves, or the monetary
base, does not mean that no relationship existed. The question raised by existing theory
is what was the relationship among changes in reserves, changes in the money supply
and changes in prices.
What Caused Changes in the Money Supply?
Theoretically, both the monetary approach to the balance of payments and the price
specie flow mechanism, focuses on an internal relationship between changes in reserves
(the monetary base) and changes in the money supply. The difference between the two
lies in the causality. While the price specie flow model in conjunction with the quantity
theory of money leads to the result that changes in reserves due to international capital
flows induces changes in the money supply, the monetary approach to the balance of
payments concludes that changes in the money supply results in changes in reserves. A
study comparing the gold standard with other international monetary arrangements by
Bayoumi and Eichengreen supports the latter view. That is, under the gold standard the
                                                
46 The Vector Error Correction on these variables actually suggests that the output (GDP) was dependent,
or at least preceded, by the money supply (see Appendix Figure 3 in Appendix A).28
money supply adjusts through the balance of payments, thereby restoring equilibrium in
asset and commodity markets.
47
Furthermore, as noted above, the minutes of the Riksbank Board, as well as the
Board’s reports to Parliament, support the validity of the monetary approach to the
balance of payments. Sufficient notes were supplied and, initially, reserves were
increased as needed.  Only when convertibility was threatened would the note issue be
constrained.
A question is whether the money supply caused price to move or vice versa? One
tendency supporting the monetary approach to the balance of payments is the existence
of the positive interlinking of price movements among countries predicted by the
purchasing power parity hypothesis.
48 Swedish wholesale prices and, to a slightly lesser
degree, consumer prices were indeed correlated with those of the Country’s trading
partners.
Figure 18: Correlations Between Annual Percentage Changes in Swedish Wholesale
and Consumer Prices with Those of her Principal Trading Partners, 1834-1913
Wholesale Price indices France Great Britain Germany
Sweden, 1861-1913 0.731* 0.780* 0.753*
Consumer Price indices France GB (England) Germany Denmark
Sweden, 1834-1913 0.373* 0.360* 0.515* 0.601*
Sweden, 1834-1873 Silver std 0.458*Not significant 0.541* 0.532*
Sweden, 1874-1913 Gold std Not significant 0.549* 0.544* 0.739*
* Significant at least at 5 %
Sources: Mitchell, B.R. (1998) pp. 856-859, 863-865, Myrdal, G. & Bouvin, S. (1933) pp. 196-199
For the entire period 1834-1913, Swedish consumer prices closely tracked those in
Germany and Denmark well. During the gold standard period, the correlation with
British prices increased while that of French prices became statistically insignificant.
During the entire period, Sweden’s place in the ”German economic bloc” was of
considerable significance. Starting with the adoption of the gold standard, Swedish
consumer prices were remarkably closely synchronized with those in Denmark.
49
                                                
47 Bayoumi, T. & Eichengreen, B. (1995) pp. 7-11, 20-21. This study included seven countries, among
them Sweden
48 Gomes, L. (1993) pp.166-167, McCloskey, D.N & Zecher, J.R. (1985) pp. 69-71. Here it would also be
expected that wholesale prices were more prone to internationally move together than consumer prices,
since the latter holds a larger amount of internationally less tradable goods than the former (for instance
housing).
49 This might be explained with the fact of Denmark and Sweden being neighboring countries, but
perhaps more significant was the Danish and Swedish establishment of the Scandinavian Currency Union
(Skandinaviska Myntunionen) in connection with the switch from the silver to the gold standard in 1873,29
These correlations definitely support the existence of international integration. They
are insufficient, however, to prove that the monetary approach to the balance of
payments was valid in all respects. In order to sort this problem out, the question has
been subjected to a VAR-model causality test.
The measure of the monetary base utilized is that excluding the net foreign assets of
the National Debt Office. The test applied to the relationship between the monetary base
and the money supplied revealed no significant causality whatever. The balance of
payments series in stable prices, however, had a positive effect on changes in the money
supply (M1) measured at stable prices. This result was not statistically significant when
the gold standard period was treated separately.
50
There are significant results of the test of the casual link between Riksbank reserves,
the money supply and prices. The somewhat puzzling outcome of this VAR causality
test is that while the money supply increased in response to increased reserves during
the previous year, it also increased if the money supply in terms of circulating notes
(M1) had decreased. Changes in the money supply in terms of notes in circulation plus
the public’s deposits in commercial banks (M2) had a positive effect on reserves two
years later. But, changes in circulating Riksbank and Enskilda bank notes (M1) after
two years negatively affected reserves.
51
                                                                                                                                          
where also Norway joined in 1875. The union made coins convertible at par, but did not include notes. In
1894 notes became convertible at par between Sweden and Norway, and in 1901 with Denmark. See
Henriksen, I & Kærgård, N. (1995) and Talia, K. (2001).
50 See Appendix Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12 in Appendix B. This result stresses the difficulty of estimating
the monetary base in accordance with a static set of rules and still making it a significant measure for
different types of economies.
51 See Appendix B for tests and a complete read out of the model. VAR models with five lags have been
tested. The 2-lag model was selected due to its relatively high adjusted R2 value and relatively low
Akaike and Schwartz values.30
Figure 19: Vector Auto Regression on the Consumer Price Index (CPI), Money Supply
(M1DEF), (M2DEF), (M3DEF), and Riksbank Reserves (RBRESDEF), 1834-1913. 2
lags, variables deflated by the consumer price index and in logarithmic form.
 Sample(adjusted): 1837 1913
 Included observations: 77 after adjusting endpoints










DLOGCPI(-1)  0.505055 -0.675919 -0.187056 -0.197512  0.013963
[ 4.02344]* [-2.07237]* [-0.60316] [-0.72937] [ 0.01853]
DLOGCPI(-2) -0.179828 -0.033946 -0.071144 -0.075151 -1.353373
[-1.52134] [-0.11053] [-0.24362] [-0.29471] [-1.90702]
DLOGM1DEF(-1)  0.242374 -0.424197 -0.393267 -0.331455  0.378014
[ 2.99483]* [-2.01728]* [-1.96687] [-1.89847] [ 0.77797]
DLOGM1DEF(-2)  0.092010 -0.404555 -0.476446 -0.436789 -1.616502
[ 1.11138] [-1.88070] [-2.32941]* [-2.44565]* [-3.25219]*
DLOGM2DEF(-1) -0.235246  0.508077  0.684517  0.714533  1.624533
[-1.34616] [ 1.11896] [ 1.58548] [ 1.89535] [ 1.54836]
DLOGM2DEF(-2) -0.010351  0.502378  0.753044  0.716169  2.916830
[-0.05813] [ 1.08574] [ 1.71161] [ 1.86419] [ 2.72812]*
DLOGM3DEF(-1)  0.236773 -0.613903 -0.545323 -0.586789 -2.123717
[ 1.25482] [-1.25217] [-1.16979] [-1.44154] [-1.87463]
DLOGM3DEF(-2)  0.000233 -0.262593 -0.285237 -0.280705 -1.718486
[ 0.00123] [-0.53380] [-0.60981] [-0.68727] [-1.51181]
DLOGRBRESDEF(-1)  0.005985  0.221332  0.121543  0.104796  0.058659
[ 0.26055] [ 3.70838]* [ 2.14172]* [ 2.11478]* [ 0.42534]
DLOGRBRESDEF(-2) -0.006199  0.118159  0.010979 -0.008273 -0.139690
[-0.25846] [ 1.89599] [ 0.18529] [-0.15988] [-0.97004]
 R-squared  0.489402  0.291574  0.223869  0.251119  0.282417
 Adj. R-squared  0.412038  0.184237  0.106273  0.137652  0.173693
* Denotes significant values at least at 5%
Sources: Myrdal, G. & Bouvin, S. (1933) pp. 196-199, Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag
af Bankernas Uppgifter 1874-1900, SCB (1960) pp. 99, 102-103, Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 54-71,
172-185
There were also significant results concerning prices. Changes in the money supply
in terms of circulating Riksbank and Enskilda bank notes (M1) resulted in a change in
consumer prices with a one year lag. The rate of change of prices was also affected by
previous prices changes, but these did not have a significant effect on the money supply.
Even though the tendency was the same throughout the eighty year period, it was
stronger under the gold than under the silver standard.
52
                                                
52 See Appendix B, Appendix Figures 7 and 8. Although not significant at the 5% level, changes in
consumer prices seemed to have a negative impact on the Riksbank’s reserves. If so, this supports the idea31
The results of the VAR test of causality can be summarized in a model designed to
explain changes in domestic prices as depending on changes in domestic monetary
variables. The neo classical quantity theory predicts that price effects due to growth in
the money supply may be off set by growth in real income. The growth of real output
was related to the growth of the money supply measured in terms of circulating notes
(M1). Therefore, changes in real GDP is also included in the model determining price
movements. Moreover, changes in consumer prices in Germany (GERCPI) is
incorporated as a proxy for international price movements.
Figure 20: OLS-regression determining changes in domestic prices (CPI), as dependent
on current and prior changes in the variables the German Consumer Prices (GERCPI),




Included observations: 78 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.000148 0.004142 0.035695 0.9716
DLOG(M1DEF(-1)) 0.208837 0.038308 5.451567 0.0000*
DLOG(CPI(-1)) 0.431343 0.082337 5.238730 0.0000*
DLOG(GDPVOL) -0.136901 0.103992 -1.316460 0.1921
DLOG(GERCPI) 0.176576 0.038591 4.575629 0.0000*
R-squared 0.545961 Mean dependent var 0.005182
Adjusted R-squared 0.521083 S.D. dependent var 0.040856
Durbin-Watson stat 2.148764 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
* Denotes significant values at least at 5%
Sources: Krantz, O. (1997) pp. 20-22, Mitchell, B.R. (1998) pp. 863-865, Myrdal, G. & Bouvin, S. (1933)
pp. 196-199, Post & Inrikes Tidning 1835-1871, Sammandrag af Bankernas Uppgifter 1874-1900,
Sveriges Riksbank (1931) pp. 172-185
As predicted by the theory, changes in prices were related to concurrent changes in
GDP (by volume). If significant, growth in the GDP acted to cushion the effect of a
growing money supply on prices.
53 Prices were positively affected by the money supply
in terms of circulating notes (M1) lagged one year. International price movements also
clearly affected domestic prices. The largest impact came from domestic price changes
lagged one period.
                                                                                                                                          
that the balance of payments was used to restore equilibrium on the money market. The R2 value, the
explanatory power (or the goodness of fit value), suggests changes in CPI as being dependent upon
changes in the money supply. For tests of the model see Appendix B.
53 GDPVOL does not appear to be significant and this is not due to problems with multicolinearity (see
Appendix C).32
This result is consistent with both the quantity theory, and thus with the price specie
flow mechanism, and the monetary approach to the balance of payments. It concludes
that prices are set in international markets. At same time, however, it was also the case
that domestic price changes were connected to domestic changes in the money supply.
This was a result of the simultaneous money supply growth experienced by the
countries operating under the specie standard. This money supply expansion, however,
was not associated with any growth in specie holdings in these countries.
It was argued above that the use of foreign financial liabilities issued in specie
standard countries as formal reserves allowed the total supply of reserves to increase,
subject only to the existence, as indeed was the case, of a liquid secondary market for
these assets. Expectations also affected the value of the reserves. Gold standard
economies experienced a simultaneous growth in their money supply. At least in the
Swedish case, and in the short run, changes in the money supply preceded changes in
consumer prices. That, however, is still consistent with a large share of these consumer
prices being determined in international markets.
Conclusions
At the outset of this paper, the causal relationships among the parameters associated
with fixed exchange rates were discussed. This discussion was predicated on the
observation that the Swedish experience under the gold standard has been presented
both within the confines of the price specie flow mechanism and its more recent variant,
the monetary approach to the balance of payments. Since the causality inherent in these
two theories is mutually incompatible, questions arose concerning how the money
supply reacted to changes in international relations as reflected in changes in central
bank reserves or the more inclusive balance of payments series.
Following the lead of Jonung and Officer, series of the monetary base and the
balance of payments were constructed for the period 1834 - 1913. This section includes
a methodological discussion of how best to treat the foreign debts of the authorities as
well as the substantial volume of notes issued by private Swedish banks. This
discussion underscored the difficulties encountered when applying a static definition of
economic concepts to the reality of various types of economies and especially to
transitional economies. Indeed, a detailed knowledge of the monetary arrangement of
the particular time and place is essential.33
The following section dealt with the nature of the international capital transactions
that affected the Swedish economy and its level of monetary reserves. Since Sweden
was dependent on international capital for imports, economic crises were actually
beneficial for her trade balance. The capital flows related to trade in goods and services,
however, were small compared to those connected to international borrowing, at least
starting in the late 1850's. It was also noted that a common specie standard did not
prevent the central bank reserves of these countries from all increasing simultaneously.
This was partly due to the elasticity inherent in the system, which left the central bank
with some ability to fudge the rules of the game. Of importance for the overall growth
of central bank reserves was the inclusion of financial assets held in other specie
standard countries.
Foreign assets were a major component of the Riksbank’s reserves. This reality has
affected the measurement of monetary discipline. Considering only actual holdings of
specie results in discipline appearing remarkably lax during the 1860's. If instead
discipline is measured in terms of the monetary base to Riksbank reserves ratio, things
look somewhat better. Nonetheless, monetary discipline seems to have become more
stringent after the international debt became significant starting the late 1860' and early
1870's. Apparently, it was the foreign debt situation, rather than the adoption of the gold
standard, that influenced behavior in this regard. What was important was not the switch
from silver to gold but the increasing dependence on the international capital market.
The growth of the money supply did not depend on specie holdings, Riksbank
reserves or even the monetary base. The only cointegration result that could be
identified was between the circulation of bank notes (M1) and real GDP.  It does seem
as if other monetary aggregates grew simultaneously with the money supply in other
countries operating under the specie standard and of major importance to the Swedish
economy.
The causality inherent in the system was then tested. Did changes in certain variables
effect the money supply or did the opposite relationship hold? Changes in the monetary
base or in specie holdings were unrelated to changes in any of the monetary aggregates.
Contrary to the qualitative evidence, the statistical tests tended to support the specie
flow hypothesis. Changes in central bank reserves, as well as in the balance of
payments, positively affected the money supply. Changes in the money supply, in turn,
were positively related to the level of consumer prices. At the same time, however,34
domestic prices were changing in line with international prices, thus tending to support
the monetary approach to the balance of payments hypothesis.
The result was summarized in an OLS-regression model in which current changes in
domestic prices were dependent on current changes in international prices. Changes in
the money supply in terms of circulating notes (M1) lagged one period and, most
importantly, price changes lagged one period also affected price changes positively.
The Swedish money supply grew in line with that of other countries operating under
the specie standard. This growth in the money supply, in turn, resulted in increasing
international prices during periods of credit expansion that were not also characterized
by rapid economic growth. Thus, prices, in addition to being connected to international
markets, responded to prior increases in the money supply. This growth in the money
supply, however, may only have been tolerated because of the similar monetary growth
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Appendix – Testing the Models
Appendix A – Johansen’s test for Cointegration
Appendix Figure 1: Complete readout from Johansen’s test on Cointegration.
Sample(adjusted): 1837 1913
Included observations: 77 after adjusting endpoints
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend
Series: GDPVOL M1DEF
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test
Hypothesized Trace 5 Percent 1 Percent
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value
None **  0.296869  30.57333  15.41  20.04
At most 1  0.043854  3.453022   3.76   6.65
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 1% levels
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 5 Percent 1 Percent
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value
None **  0.296869  27.12031  14.07  18.63
At most 1  0.043854  3.453022   3.76   6.65
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 1% levels
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):
GDPVOL M1DEF
 0.059857  0.001305
-0.254602  0.008094
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):
D(GDPVOL)  0.534560  0.047250
D(M1DEF)  15.33175 -12.37360
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood -525.5739
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (std.err. in parentheses)
GDPVOL M1DEF
 1.000000  0.021794
 (0.00953)
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Appendix Figure 3: Vector Error Correction Model with the Variables GDP in Volumes
and money supply in stable prices (M1DEF).
Vector Error Correction Estimates
 Sample(adjusted): 1837 1913
 Included observations: 77 after adjusting        endpoints







Error Correction: D(GDPVOL) D(M1DEF)
CointEq1  0.031997  0.917712
 (0.00606)  (0.45197)
[ 5.28013] [ 2.03048]
D(GDPVOL(-1)) -0.310264 -8.883852
 (0.12653)  (9.43679)
[-2.45216] [-0.94141]
D(GDPVOL(-2)) -0.250381 -0.829902
 (0.12178)  (9.08257)40
[-2.05605] [-0.09137]
D(M1DEF(-1))  0.003095 -0.068725
 (0.00162)  (0.12051)
[ 1.91570] [-0.57026]
D(M1DEF(-2))  0.002625 -0.096526
 (0.00171)  (0.12719)
[ 1.53950] [-0.75892]
C  0.959174  27.90645
 (0.16124)  (12.0259)
[ 5.94868] [ 2.32053]
 R-squared  0.385828  0.072504
 Adj. R-squared  0.342576  0.007187
 Sum sq. resids  56.03423  311698.1
 S.E. equation  0.888377  66.25794
 F-statistic  8.920541  1.110037
 Log likelihood -97.02132 -429.0387
 Akaike AIC  2.675878  11.29971
 Schwarz SC  2.858513  11.48234
 Mean dependent  0.707792  18.46150
 S.D. dependent  1.095657  66.49734
 Determinant Residual Covariance  3421.270
 Log Likelihood -525.5739
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) -531.8206
 Akaike Information Criteria  14.17716
 Schwarz Criteria  14.60330
Appendix B – Vector Auto Regression Tests on Causality (precedence)
Appendix Figure 4: Complete read out from the VAR test on CPI, Money Supply and
Riksbank Reserves
Vector Autoregression Estimates
 Sample(adjusted): 1837 1913
 Included observations: 77 after adjusting endpoints
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
DLOG(CPI) DLOG(M1DEF) DLOG(M2DEF) DLOG(M3DEF) DLOG(RBRESDEF)
DLOGCPI(-1)  0.505055 -0.675919 -0.187056 -0.197512  0.013963
 (0.12553)  (0.32616)  (0.31013)  (0.27080)  (0.75365)
[ 4.02344]* [-2.07237]* [-0.60316] [-0.72937] [ 0.01853]
DLOGCPI(-2) -0.179828 -0.033946 -0.071144 -0.075151 -1.353373
 (0.11820)  (0.30713)  (0.29203)  (0.25500)  (0.70968)
[-1.52134] [-0.11053] [-0.24362] [-0.29471] [-1.90702]
DLOGM1DEF(-1)  0.242374 -0.424197 -0.393267 -0.331455  0.378014
 (0.08093)  (0.21028)  (0.19995)  (0.17459)  (0.48590)
[ 2.99483]* [-2.01728]* [-1.96687] [-1.89847] [ 0.77797]
DLOGM1DEF(-2)  0.092010 -0.404555 -0.476446 -0.436789 -1.61650241
 (0.08279)  (0.21511)  (0.20453)  (0.17860)  (0.49705)
[ 1.11138] [-1.88070] [-2.32941]* [-2.44565]* [-3.25219]*
DLOGM2DEF(-1) -0.235246  0.508077  0.684517  0.714533  1.624533
 (0.17475)  (0.45406)  (0.43174)  (0.37699)  (1.04920)
[-1.34616] [ 1.11896] [ 1.58548] [ 1.89535] [ 1.54836]
DLOGM2DEF(-2) -0.010351  0.502378  0.753044  0.716169  2.916830
 (0.17808)  (0.46271)  (0.43996)  (0.38417)  (1.06917)
[-0.05813] [ 1.08574] [ 1.71161] [ 1.86419] [ 2.72812]*
DLOGM3DEF(-1)  0.236773 -0.613903 -0.545323 -0.586789 -2.123717
 (0.18869)  (0.49027)  (0.46617)  (0.40706)  (1.13287)
[ 1.25482] [-1.25217] [-1.16979] [-1.44154] [-1.87463]
DLOGM3DEF(-2)  0.000233 -0.262593 -0.285237 -0.280705 -1.718486
 (0.18933)  (0.49193)  (0.46775)  (0.40844)  (1.13671)
[ 0.00123] [-0.53380] [-0.60981] [-0.68727] [-1.51181]
DLOGRBRESDEF(-1)  0.005985  0.221332  0.121543  0.104796  0.058659
 (0.02297)  (0.05968)  (0.05675)  (0.04955)  (0.13791)
[ 0.26055] [ 3.70838]* [ 2.14172]* [ 2.11478]* [ 0.42534]
DLOGRBRESDEF(-2) -0.006199  0.118159  0.010979 -0.008273 -0.139690
 (0.02399)  (0.06232)  (0.05926)  (0.05174)  (0.14400)
[-0.25846] [ 1.89599] [ 0.18529] [-0.15988] [-0.97004]
C -0.003106  0.028164  0.035467  0.041023  0.026989
 (0.00613)  (0.01592)  (0.01514)  (0.01322)  (0.03678)
[-0.50700] [ 1.76936] [ 2.34335] [ 3.10403] [ 0.73378]
 R-squared  0.489402  0.291574  0.223869  0.251119  0.282417
 Adj. R-squared  0.412038  0.184237  0.106273  0.137652  0.173693
 Sum sq. resids  0.065506  0.442236  0.399829  0.304855  2.361241
 S.E. equation  0.031504  0.081857  0.077833  0.067963  0.189146
 F-statistic  6.326016  2.716426  1.903718  2.213146  2.597546
 Log likelihood  162.9145  89.39086  93.27193  103.7132  24.89953
 Akaike AIC -3.945831 -2.036126 -2.136933 -2.408134 -0.361027
 Schwarz SC -3.611001 -1.701297 -1.802104 -2.073305 -0.026197
 Mean dependent  0.005380  0.016714  0.044039  0.048666  0.011147
 S.D. dependent  0.041086  0.090630  0.082331  0.073187  0.208079
 Determinant Residual Covariance  1.15E-13
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted)  600.8268
 Akaike Information Criteria -14.17732
 Schwarz Criteria -12.50317
Appendix Figure 5: Residual Normality Tests
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)
H0: residuals are multivariate normal
Sample: 1834 1913
Included observations: 77
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob.
1  0.260182  0.868748 1  0.3513
2 -0.304470  1.189673 1  0.275442
3  0.333877  1.430585 1  0.2317
4  1.598821  32.80495 1  0.0000
5 -0.008145  0.000851 1  0.9767
Joint  36.29481 5  0.0000
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob.
1  2.131540  2.419797 1  0.1198
2  3.065657  0.013830 1  0.9064
3  2.700615  0.287567 1  0.5918
4  6.846068  47.45843 1  0.0000
5  1.741933  5.077934 1  0.0242
Joint  55.25756 5  0.0000
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.
1  3.288545 2  0.1932
2  1.203503 2  0.5479
3  1.718152 2  0.4236
4  80.26339 2  0.0000
5  5.078785 2  0.0789
Joint  91.55237 10  0.0000
Appendix Figure 6: Test for Serial Correlation
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests




1  17.00311  0.8817
2  21.79500  0.6476
3  21.17949  0.6826
4  20.96463  0.6946
5  51.24433  0.0015
6  32.13726  0.1541
7  45.79427  0.0068
8  28.74145  0.2749
9  25.76564  0.4202
10  31.19452  0.1827
11  22.96344  0.5797
12  27.51382  0.3307
Probs from chi-square with 25 df.43
Appendix Figure 7: VAR test on CPI, Money Supply and Riksbank Reserves, 1834-1873
(Silver Standard).
 Sample(adjusted): 1837 1873
 Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
 Standard errors & t-statistics in parentheses
DLOG(CPI) DLOG(M1DEF) DLOG(M2DEF) DLOG(M3DEF) DLOG(RBRESDEF)
DLOG(CPI(-1))  0.459713 -0.789539 -0.221404 -0.212514  0.998484
 (0.18592)  (0.54443)  (0.53687)  (0.46711)  (1.06878)
 (2.47267)* (-1.45020) (-0.41240) (-0.45496)  (0.93423)
DLOG(CPI(-2)) -0.247281 -0.043396 -0.146659 -0.102237 -1.141393
 (0.17907)  (0.52439)  (0.51711)  (0.44992)  (1.02944)
(-1.38088) (-0.08275) (-0.28361) (-0.22724) (-1.10875)
DLOG(M1DEF(-1))  0.280349 -0.282025 -0.526117 -0.366415  1.519916
 (0.18006)  (0.52729)  (0.51996)  (0.45240)  (1.03512)
 (1.55696) (-0.53486) (-1.01184) (-0.80994)  (1.46835)
DLOG(M1DEF(-2)) -0.008705 -0.770717 -1.139886 -1.050876 -3.070226
 (0.18677)  (0.54692)  (0.53932)  (0.46924)  (1.07366)
(-0.04661) (-1.40919) (-2.11356)* (-2.23951)* (-2.85958)*
DLOG(M2DEF(-1)) -0.397689  0.569096  0.831276  0.974372  0.818974
 (0.27840)  (0.81525)  (0.80392)  (0.69946)  (1.60042)
(-1.42849)  (0.69806)  (1.03402)  (1.39302)  (0.51172)
DLOG(M2DEF(-2))  0.092611  0.891182  1.193747  1.280903  3.680434
 (0.28717)  (0.84094)  (0.82926)  (0.72151)  (1.65086)
 (0.32249)  (1.05974)  (1.43954)  (1.77532)  (2.22941)*
DLOG(M3DEF(-1))  0.318081 -1.058410 -0.875232 -1.089274 -2.655263
 (0.25574)  (0.74889)  (0.73849)  (0.64253)  (1.47015)
 (1.24378) (-1.41330) (-1.18517) (-1.69529) (-1.80611)
DLOG(M3DEF(-2))  0.027128 -0.282357 -0.184345 -0.300744 -1.153751
 (0.27095)  (0.79344)  (0.78242)  (0.68075)  (1.55761)
 (0.10012) (-0.35586) (-0.23561) (-0.44178) (-0.74072)
DLOG(RBRESDEF(-1))  0.016982  0.358471  0.270300  0.235449  0.311724
 (0.03990)  (0.11683)  (0.11521)  (0.10024)  (0.22936)
 (0.42564)  (3.06823)  (2.34615)*  (2.34886)*  (1.35913)
DLOG(RBRESDEF(-2)) -0.005013  0.122325  0.039041 -0.017746 -0.285356
 (0.04643)  (0.13598)  (0.13409)  (0.11666)  (0.26694)
(-0.10796)  (0.89960)  (0.29116) (-0.15211) (-1.06900)
 R-squared  0.583455  0.364859  0.369369  0.407774  0.428508
 Adj. R-squared  0.423245  0.120574  0.126819  0.179995  0.20870444
Appendix Figure 8: VAR test on CPI, Money Supply and Riksbank Reserves, 1874-1913
(Gold Standard)
 Sample: 1874 1913
 Included observations: 40
 Standard errors & t-statistics in parentheses
DLOG(CPI) DLOG(M1DEF) DLOG(M2DEF) DLOG(M3DEF) DLOG(RBRESDEF)
DLOG(CPI(-1))  0.139380 -0.387043 -0.542497 -0.229961 -2.468987
 (0.23304)  (0.54317)  (0.37046)  (0.30210)  (1.46242)
 (0.59811) (-0.71256) (-1.46438) (-0.76121) (-1.68829)
DLOG(CPI(-2))  0.393627 -0.235505  0.517276  0.222097 -1.257659
 (0.21660)  (0.50487)  (0.34434)  (0.28080)  (1.35931)
 (1.81726) (-0.46646)  (1.50222)  (0.79095) (-0.92522)
DLOG(M1DEF(-1))  0.316570 -0.429019 -0.060244 -0.085607 -0.078433
 (0.08199)  (0.19110)  (0.13034)  (0.10629)  (0.51451)
 (3.86122)* (-2.24501) (-0.46222) (-0.80545) (-0.15244)
DLOG(M1DEF(-2))  0.259840 -0.409347 -0.012236 -0.114383 -0.803059
 (0.09528)  (0.22209)  (0.15147)  (0.12352)  (0.59794)
 (2.72707)* (-1.84318) (-0.08078) (-0.92603) (-1.34304)
DLOG(M2DEF(-1))  1.097646 -0.626759  0.635186 -0.312780 -1.675661
 (0.46898)  (1.09312)  (0.74555)  (0.60797)  (2.94309)
 (2.34050)* (-0.57337)  (0.85197) (-0.51447) (-0.56935)
DLOG(M2DEF(-2)) -0.741689  0.378830  0.268423  0.535720  7.222212
 (0.40868)  (0.95258)  (0.64969)  (0.52980)  (2.56470)
(-1.81483)  (0.39769)  (0.41315)  (1.01117)  (2.81601)*
DLOG(M3DEF(-1)) -1.442504  0.658706 -0.797592  0.477402  1.338781
 (0.64231)  (1.49712)  (1.02109)  (0.83266)  (4.03081)
(-2.24582)*  (0.43998) (-0.78112)  (0.57334)  (0.33214)
DLOG(M3DEF(-2))  0.899027 -0.567413  0.111130 -0.304367 -7.126188
 (0.54217)  (1.26372)  (0.86190)  (0.70285)  (3.40241)
 (1.65820) (-0.44900)  (0.12894) (-0.43305) (-2.09445)*
DLOG(RBRESDEF(-1))  0.026606  0.105057  0.025515  0.015744 -0.145594
 (0.02864)  (0.06675)  (0.04552)  (0.03712)  (0.17971)
 (0.92909)  (1.57395)  (0.56047)  (0.42409) (-0.81017)
DLOG(RBRESDEF(-2))  0.007141  0.113968 -0.006682  0.001162 -0.134234
 (0.02596)  (0.06050)  (0.04126)  (0.03365)  (0.16289)
 (0.27511)  (1.88374) (-0.16193)  (0.03452) (-0.82407)
 R-squared  0.611864  0.388137  0.256810  0.310863  0.466140
 Adj. R-squared  0.478024  0.177149  0.000538  0.073229  0.28205145
Appendix Figure 9: VAR test on Causality between the Monetary Base and different
Money Supply measures
Sample(adjusted): 1837 1913
 Included observations: 77 after adjusting endpoints
 Standard errors & t-statistics in parentheses
DLOG(MBASEDEF) DLOG(M1DEF) DLOG(M2DEF) DLOG(M3DEF)
DLOG(MBASEDEF(-1))  0.266340  0.115037  0.013939  0.037152
 (0.15387)  (0.12267)  (0.10776)  (0.09478)
 (1.73097)  (0.93775)  (0.12935)  (0.39198)
DLOG(MBASEDEF(-2)) -0.039195  0.149851  0.077718  0.030109
 (0.14889)  (0.11871)  (0.10427)  (0.09172)
(-0.26324)  (1.26235)  (0.74532)  (0.32828)
DLOG(M1DEF(-1))  0.189004 -0.280256 -0.360762 -0.309932
 (0.27093)  (0.21600)  (0.18974)  (0.16689)
 (0.69762) (-1.29748) (-1.90139) (-1.85713)
DLOG(M1DEF(-2)) -0.582646 -0.403142 -0.423008 -0.403614
 (0.28063)  (0.22374)  (0.19653)  (0.17286)
(-2.07623)* (-1.80187) (-2.15238)* (-2.33488)*
DLOG(M2DEF(-1))  0.541515  0.254739  0.634004  0.643862
 (0.60036)  (0.47865)  (0.42044)  (0.36981)
 (0.90199)  (0.53221)  (1.50794)  (1.74105)
DLOG(M2DEF(-2))  1.004013  0.639253  0.799186  0.746806
 (0.61790)  (0.49264)  (0.43273)  (0.38062)
 (1.62487)  (1.29762)  (1.84683)  (1.96207)
DLOG(M3DEF(-1)) -0.905861 -0.051759 -0.286690 -0.355129
 (0.64544)  (0.51459)  (0.45202)  (0.39758)
(-1.40349) (-0.10058) (-0.63425) (-0.89322)
DLOG(M3DEF(-2)) -0.380648 -0.478166 -0.456905 -0.405638
 (0.64756)  (0.51628)  (0.45350)  (0.39889)
(-0.58782) (-0.92618) (-1.00750) (-1.01692)
C  0.013651  0.011011  0.029140  0.035612
 (0.02080)  (0.01658)  (0.01457)  (0.01281)
 (0.65628)  (0.66391)  (2.00029)  (2.77931)
 R-squared  0.142538  0.105410  0.163562  0.181084
 Adj. R-squared  0.041660  0.000164  0.065157  0.084741
 Sum sq. resids  0.878563  0.558449  0.430896  0.333364
 S.E. equation  0.113666  0.090623  0.079603  0.070017
 F-statistic  1.412971  1.001555  1.662135  1.879578
 Log likelihood  62.96273  80.40803  90.39092  100.2712
 Akaike AIC -1.401629 -1.854754 -2.114050 -2.370681
 Schwarz SC -1.127678 -1.580803 -1.840098 -2.096730
 Mean dependent  0.016045  0.016714  0.044039  0.048666
 S.D. dependent  0.116111  0.090630  0.082331  0.073187
 Determinant Residual Covariance  3.38E-11
 Log Likelihood  491.2444
 Akaike Information Criteria -11.82453
 Schwarz Criteria -10.7287246
Appendix Figure 10: Vector Auto Regression on Balance of Payments (BOPDEF) and
Money Supply (M1DEF), (M2DEF), (M3DEF), 1834-1913. 1 lag, variables deflated by
the Consumer Price Index
Sample(adjusted): 1836 1913
 Included observations: 78 after adjusting endpoints
 Standard errors & t-statistics in parentheses
BOPDEF D(M1DEF) D(M2DEF) D(M3DEF)
BOPDEF(-1) -0.131540  0.219091  0.492983  0.727992
 (0.11821)  (0.08862)  (0.30716)  (0.42503)
(-1.11279)  (2.47237)*  (1.60498)  (1.71281)
D(M1DEF(-1))  0.115429 -0.220659 -1.573284 -2.119373
 (0.18096)  (0.13566)  (0.47021)  (0.65065)
 (0.63789) (-1.62660) (-3.34593)* (-3.25733)*
D(M2DEF(-1))  0.009853 -0.189128  0.558760  0.031320
 (0.13310)  (0.09978)  (0.34585)  (0.47857)
 (0.07402) (-1.89545)  (1.61559)  (0.06545)
D(M3DEF(-1))  0.043778  0.170193  0.158253  0.753409
 (0.09944)  (0.07455)  (0.25840)  (0.35755)
 (0.44024)  (2.28300)*  (0.61244)  (2.10712)*
C -5.280886  7.748013  72.54861  113.0354
 (12.3206)  (9.23636)  (32.0148)  (44.3003)
(-0.42862)  (0.83886)  (2.26610)  (2.55157)
 R-squared  0.078877  0.141728  0.429800  0.425870
 Adj. R-squared  0.028405  0.094700  0.398556  0.394410
Appendix Figure 11: Vector Auto Regression on Balance of Payments (BOPDEF) and
Money Supply (M1DEF), (M2DEF), (M3DEF), Silver Standard, 1834-1873 Silver
Standard. 1 lag, variables deflated by the Consumer Price Index
Sample(adjusted): 1837 1873
 Included observations: 37 after adjusting endpoints
 Standard errors & t-statistics in parentheses
D(BOPDEF) D(M1DEF) D(M2DEF) D(M3DEF)
D(BOPDEF(-1)) -0.720332  0.180904  0.184776  0.242120
 (0.18526)  (0.08436)  (0.15228)  (0.17850)
(-3.88827)*  (2.14454)*  (1.21340)  (1.35641)
D(BOPDEF(-2)) -0.221156  0.114159  0.052292  0.019871
 (0.18763)  (0.08543)  (0.15423)  (0.18078)
(-1.17869)  (1.33621)  (0.33905)  (0.10992)
D(M1DEF(-1)) -0.222415  0.101424 -0.027606 -0.388453
 (0.90789)  (0.41340)  (0.74627)  (0.87477)
(-0.24498)  (0.24534) (-0.03699) (-0.44406)
D(M1DEF(-2)) -2.731893 -0.698882 -1.673175 -1.935130
 (1.17327)  (0.53424)  (0.96441)  (1.13047)
(-2.32845)* (-1.30819) (-1.73492) (-1.71179)
D(M2DEF(-1))  1.135719  0.075000 -0.718792 -0.571516
 (1.32149)  (0.60173)  (1.08625)  (1.27329)
 (0.85942)  (0.12464) (-0.66172) (-0.44885)
D(M2DEF(-2))  1.158251  0.659572  1.006682  1.551423
 (1.45525)  (0.66263)  (1.19620)  (1.40216)47
 (0.79591)  (0.99538)  (0.84157)  (1.10645)
D(M3DEF(-1)) -1.196840 -0.241179  0.460389  0.597879
 (1.11227)  (0.50646)  (0.91427)  (1.07169)
(-1.07604) (-0.47621)  (0.50356)  (0.55788)
D(M3DEF(-2))  0.341587 -0.015319  0.330799  0.088305
 (1.01305)  (0.46128)  (0.83271)  (0.97609)
 (0.33719) (-0.03321)  (0.39725)  (0.09047)
 R-squared  0.475553  0.266201  0.382786  0.468645
 Adj. R-squared  0.325712  0.056544  0.206439  0.316829
Appendix Figure 12: Vector Auto Regression on Balance of Payments (BOPDEF) and
Money Supply (M1DEF), (M2DEF), (M3DEF), Gold Standard, 1874-1913. 1 lag,
variables deflated by the Consumer Price Index
Sample: 1874 1913
 Included observations: 40
 Standard errors & t-statistics in parentheses
D(BOPDEF) D(M1DEF) D(M2DEF) D(M3DEF)
D(BOPDEF(-1)) -0.609217  0.081466  0.019577  0.026396
 (0.15956)  (0.15152)  (0.61040)  (0.82588)
(-3.81818)*  (0.53766)  (0.03207)  (0.03196)
D(BOPDEF(-2)) -0.358289  0.043203  0.203052  0.345616
 (0.16151)  (0.15338)  (0.61788)  (0.83599)
(-2.21836)*  (0.28168)  (0.32863)  (0.41342)
D(M1DEF(-1))  0.219384 -0.223622 -0.969612 -1.227726
 (0.23168)  (0.22001)  (0.88631)  (1.19919)
 (0.94693) (-1.01642) (-1.09398) (-1.02380)
D(M1DEF(-2)) -0.189144 -0.430006 -0.293961 -1.488808
 (0.21376)  (0.20299)  (0.81776)  (1.10644)
(-0.88484) (-2.11833) (-0.35947) (-1.34559)
D(M2DEF(-1)) -0.026997 -0.185400  0.995339  0.378444
 (0.14679)  (0.13939)  (0.56155)  (0.75978)
(-0.18392) (-1.33006)  (1.77249)  (0.49810)
D(M2DEF(-2))  0.083202 -0.052635 -0.414915 -0.312738
 (0.15508)  (0.14727)  (0.59328)  (0.80271)
 (0.53650) (-0.35741) (-0.69936) (-0.38960)
D(M3DEF(-1))  0.038293  0.127923 -0.461418 -0.034255
 (0.11301)  (0.10732)  (0.43233)  (0.58494)
 (0.33885)  (1.19203) (-1.06729) (-0.05856)
D(M3DEF(-2)) -0.070653  0.108898  0.570985  0.769604
 (0.11923)  (0.11322)  (0.45612)  (0.61714)
(-0.59258)  (0.96180)  (1.25182)  (1.24706)
 R-squared  0.450242  0.217460  0.345865  0.320863
 Adj. R-squared  0.308368  0.015515  0.177056  0.14560248
Appendix C – Tests of the OLS-model determining price changes





Included observations: 78 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.000148 0.004142 0.035695 0.9716
DLOG(M1DEF(-1)) 0.208837 0.038308 5.451567 0.0000
DLOG(CPI(-1)) 0.431343 0.082337 5.238730 0.0000
DLOG(GDPVOL) -0.136901 0.103992 -1.316460 0.1921
DLOG(GERCPI) 0.176576 0.038591 4.575629 0.0000
R-squared 0.545961     Mean dependent var 0.005182
Adjusted R-squared 0.521083     S.D. dependent var 0.040856
S.E. of regression 0.028274     Akaike info criterion -4.231804
Sum squared resid 0.058357     Schwarz criterion -4.080733
Log likelihood 170.0404     F-statistic 21.94482
Durbin-Watson stat 2.148764     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Appendix Figure 14: Distribution of Residuals, Histogram Normality Test on the OLS







































































































Mean     -1.76E-18
Median   0.001667
Maximum   0.063584
Minimum -0.072907
Std. Dev.    0.027530
Skewness    0.002068
Kurtosis    2.818825
Jarque-Bera  0.106734
Probability  0.948032
Appendix Figure 15: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test
F-statistic 0.821904     Probability 0.367648
Obs*R-squared 0.880346     Probability 0.348107
Appendix Figure 16: White Heteroskedasticity Test (including cross-terms)
F-statistic 0.939496     Probability 0.523139
Obs*R-squared 13.47196     Probability 0.48974449
Appendix Figure 17: Ramsey RESET Test (general stability and specification test)
F-statistic 0.332781     Probability 0.565825
Log likelihood ratio 0.359682     Probability 0.548683
Appendix Figure 18: Testing for multicolinearity (Correlations between independent
variables)
DLOG (M1DEF(-1)) DLOG (GDPVOL) DLOG (GERCPI) DLOG (CPI(-1))
DLOG(M1DEF(-1))  1.000000  0.175461  0.174360 -0.260304
DLOG(GDPVOL)  0.175461  1.000000 -0.212240 -0.136634
DLOG(GERCPI)  0.174360 -0.212240  1.000000  0.057755
DLOG(CPI(-1)) -0.260304 -0.136634  0.057755  1.000000
Multicolinearity does not seem to be a problem in the model, and thus it is questionable
whether changes in GDP has any impact on changes in prices